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AUTHORS:
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ABSTRACT
Techniques are described herein to provide distributed end-to-end policy
management across a chain of service provider networks (i.e., administrative domains).
The techniques leverage an agent-centric framework for a fully distributed peer-to-peer
network that allows nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g.,
Holochain). With this framework, the techniques are able to quickly and conveniently
indicate network policies across a chain of service providers, in a distributed manner, and
guarantee that requirements of the policies are met along the chain of service providers.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Internet-based applications and services are often provided to a network by a chain
of administrative domains. For example, administrative domains of service providers in a
chain of service providers (referred to herein as a “SP chain”) may convey packets for a
given Internet Protocol (IP) service or application. Often, an SP chain provides static
network parameters (i.e., a fixed maximum bandwidth) and the various administrative
domains forming the chain are unable to communicate to coordinate any changes (e.g., to
propagate filter rules across the SP chain). Consequently, it may be difficult, expensive,
and/or inefficient for a network (i.e., a home network or enterprise network) to obtain
connectivity for an IP application or service with suitable network parameters, especially
for networks with shifting and dynamic needs (i.e., networks that intermittently or
infrequently need increased upload speed, bandwidth, etc. for a particular service or
application). Moreover, the foregoing issues may make it difficult to achieve privacy in
an SP chain for differential service offerings.
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As a specific example, enterprises may need to intermittently export large amounts
of data (e.g., hundreds of gigabytes or one or more terabytes) to the Cloud for big data
analytics (e.g., network assurance, wireless service assurance, etc.), but may only
intermittently need increased upload speeds for these exports and would rather not pay for
the increased upload speeds between uploads. As another example, a home network user
might want increased bandwidth to watch a three-dimensional (3D) movie for two hours,
but might not want to pay for this increased bandwidth before and after watching the 3D
movie. Typically, there are not convenient, efficient, and secure techniques available to
allow these temporary on-demand (i.e., requirement driven) end-to-end IP connectivity
service requests to be indicated and guaranteed across an SP chain.
Moreover, often an SP chain may have a limited ability to identify and defend
against network threats/attacks, such as a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack (e.g.,
since limited communications between administrative domains limit the SP chain’s ability
to collectively filter traffic from an attacker). For example, with DDoS attacks, an attacker
attempts to compromise host devices and use those infected host devices to make machines
or network resources (e.g., an application server, a client, a router, a firewall, or a network
list of an entire network etc.) unavailable to their intended users. DDoS attack can be
mitigated by blocking traffic from the attacker(s) (e.g., with filter rules); however, currently,
there are not many techniques that allow for communication across an SP chain to
coordinate such efforts (e.g., to propagate filtering rules).
Some techniques utilize blockchain techniques to try to provide communication
across SP chains. However, recently, blockchain has been discovered to have a number of
drawbacks/limitations. For example, since blockchain techniques require data to be
replicated on all blockchain nodes, blockchain techniques may create scalability issues.
Moreover, the number of transactions may limit scaling. Additionally, convergence time
may be relatively long for some blockchains so that, for example, adding transactions to a
blockchain might take a couple of minutes in some uses cases. Still further, time must be
synchronized across blockchain nodes since timestamps are part of transactions and are
used during merging of ledgers (thus, nodes that are not time-synchronized may create
ledger issues).
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In view of the foregoing, the techniques presented herein enable communication
across an SP chain to provide distributed end-to-end policy management across multiple
service providers networks (i.e., administrative domains). To achieve this, the techniques
leverages an agent-centric framework for a fully distributed peer-to-peer network that
allows nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g., a Holochain
framework). With this framework (referred to herein as “agent-centric framework,” “the
framework”, “agent-centric hash chain framework,” etc.), the techniques are able to
quickly and conveniently indicate network policies across a chain of service providers, in
a distributed manner, and guarantee that requirements of the policies are met along the
chain of service providers. Notably, since the end-to-end policy management is distributed,
the techniques may be easily scalable. Moreover, the framework ensures that the end-toend policy management is efficient (e.g., since convergence is unnecessary).
Generally, these techniques are generic in nature so that they are applicable to any
end-to-end or multi-node policy that should be verified across multiple service provider
networks (i.e., administrative domains). That is, the techniques presented herein provide a
convenient and useful method to indicate, in a distributed manner, any network policy
across domains of an SP chain and to guarantee, in a distributed manner, that the
requirements are met. Thus, although the techniques presented herein are discussed with
respect to satisfying on-demand bandwidth requests and defending against DDoS attacks,
the techniques can also be used with for a variety of other functions/purposes, such as
service level agreement (SLA) management and verification (e.g., via performance
metrics). That said, among other advantages, these techniques can allow an SP chain to
accommodate additional bandwidth for specific duration (e.g., which subscribers can
request and pay for accordingly) and/or to defend against attacks (e.g., a DDoS attack).
The techniques may also ensure privacy of and/or allow granularity for an SP chain by, for
example, managing fixed and variable costs of an SP chain and/or adjusting the services in
the SP chain on a per-customer basis (which may be valuable to customers and service
providers).
As a specific example, Figure 1 below provides a sequence diagram that illustrates
how the techniques can determine if IP service/application requirements are met across an
SP chain by leveraging a fully distributed peer-to-peer agent-centric framework that allows
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nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g., Holochain). Generally,
the framework provides a fully distributed way of data sharing and access, with secure
peer-to-peer network communication (i.e., no centralized server, no ledgers, no
intermediaries, no miners). Each node stores its own immutable hash chain to maintain
ordered transactions based on a time sequence at each node (and, thus, is agent-centric)
and can communicate with other nodes to propagate data. For example, when a node
receives a message, it can broadcast the message to some or all of its peers, which can
propagate the message to their peers, creating an exponential rate of propagation. The
nodes can each share entries, metadata, neighborhood health, and peer addresses.
Additionally, the framework may utilize digital signatures that provide authenticity
and ownership of data and a distributed hash table (DHT) to provide de-centralized data
storage (e.g., so that data can be hosted by entities other than a centralized authority
system). The DHT utilizes cryptographic hashes for content-addressable storage and
validates with the hash-chains and digital signature before storing transactions.
Generally, in a DHT, nodes coordinate amongst themselves to balance and store
data in the network without any central coordinating party. DHTs are both fault tolerant
and resilient when key/value pairs are replicated, but require that information to be evenly
distributed across the network. Thus, DHTs utilize consistent hashing, where a key is
passed through a hash algorithm that serves as a randomization function, ensuring that each
node in the network has an equal chance of being chosen to store the key/value pair.
Typically, DHTs only use the hash of the data itself to confirm authenticity, provenance,
timelines, or integrity of data sources. However, in the framework leveraged by the
presented techniques, validation rules can be embedded as a condition for the propagation
of data, which keeps data bound to signed source chains (e.g., the framework may use a
Holochain DHT). This provides similar consistency and rule enforcement to blockchain
ledgers in an asynchronous manner while alleviating bottlenecks caused by consensus
requirements. That is, the framework DHT leverages signed source chains to ensure
tamper-proof immutability of data and to verify data origins and provenance.

The

framework DHT also emulates aspects of a graph database by enabling nodes to connect
links to other hashes in the DHT tagged with semantic markers, which may help locate
hashes for retrieval from the DHT.
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As mentioned above, Figure 1 illustrates how the techniques presented herein can
leverage the framework (e.g., Holochain framework) to determine if IP service/application
requirements are met across an SP chain. This example illustrates how the techniques can
handle an on-demand bandwidth request, but as mentioned, this is merely an example and
the techniques are applicable to a variety of parameters. Initially, an enterprise or home
network implementing the techniques presented herein creates a request for the service
providers in an SP chain provide additional bandwidth for a flow or set of flows for a
specific duration. The enterprise or home network may also convey path characteristics,
like downstream or upstream delay tolerance, loss tolerance, jitter tolerance, minimum and
maximum bandwidth in the request. That is, the enterprise or home network can create a
transaction T with a general or specific request.
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Once the request is created, a node of the decentralized framework associated with
the home or enterprise network signs transaction T and adds it to its local hash-chain.
Although Figure 1 illustrates the node as a device in the home or enterprise network, the
node could also be a service provider node directly connected to the home or enterprise
network. Next, the signed transaction T is published to the DHT and the request is
conveyed (using peer-to-peer communication protocols) to all other service providers in
the SP chain. In response to the request, each service provider in the SP chain processes
the request and publishes a signed notification response to the DHT (e.g., indicating they
can and will accommodate the bandwidth requirement). Assuming all of the service
providers in the SP chain agree, the last service provider in the SP chain also publishes a
signed notification to every other Service Provider in the chain, allowing every service
provider on the SP chain to know the request has reached the last service provider. At this
point, the enterprise or home network will also know if the bandwidth requirement can be
fully or partially met by the service providers in the SP chain.
If the requested path characteristics will be honored by all the service providers in
the SP chain, the enterprise or home network can execute a payment deposit contract to
pay to the service providers in the SP chain. Once the payment deposit contract is executed,
service providers in the SP chain provision their network to accommodate the path
characteristics conveyed by the enterprise or home network and the enterprise or home
network can use the applications that need additional bandwidth for the requested duration.
Moreover, during the requested duration of time, service providers in the SP chain can
publish network performance metrics for SLA monitoring. If the SLA requirements are
met for the requested duration, the payment deposit contract will be executed to pay to the
service providers in the SP chain.
Consequently, the techniques may allow multiple businesses or enterprises to be
part of the same end-to-end request. Moreover, the techniques can track service provider
compliance with requests without an out-of-band and/or centralized mechanism. Still
further, during execution of these techniques, fixed and variable costs of the SP chain can
be managed privately because the framework may implement generic validation rules for
the whole SP chain and service provider specific validation rules that include fixed and
variable costing, security policies, services offered etc. That is, the techniques presented
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herein resolve on-demand end-to-end provisioning in an SP chain (e.g., bandwidth
demands) in an efficient, private, secure, and authentic manner.
If, instead, the transaction T of Figure 1 was intended to protect against a DDoS
attack, transaction T could request to enforce filter rules (e.g., conveyed in Boarder
Gateway Protocol (BGP) flowspec). The transaction T could include DDoS attack details
such as attack type, total dropped packet count, average dropped packets per second etc.
and would be signed and stored in local Hash-Chain. As mentioned above, once a
transaction T is stored in the local Hash-Chain, the transaction T is published to the DHT
and conveyed (using peer-to-peer communication protocols) to all other service providers
in the SP chain.
After the transaction T is published and conveyed, service providers in the SP chain
could use DDoS detection techniques to analyze flow records, packet samples collected
from the attackers IP addresses (e.g., conveyed in the BGP flowspec) to check if a DDoS
attack has been launched on a target/victim (e.g., the home or enterprise network initiating
the request). Then, DDoS traffic from the attacker will be filtered and the target/victim
network will know which service providers in the SP chain agreed to honor the filtering
rules. Moreover, if service providers did not agree, it might be indicative that the service
providers are compromised. Since the framework leveraged by the techniques presented
herein provides a tamper-proof manner of conveying information in full distributed
computing environment, the conveyed information is not only authentic, it is immutable.
Thus, among other advantages, when the techniques implemented herein are utilized to
defend against DDoS, the techniques may gather DDoS attack information and applicationlevel statistics in a distributed manner and acquire application level acknowledgement that
filtering rules are being enforced.
In summary, techniques are described herein to provide distributed end-to-end
policy management across a chain of service provider networks (i.e., administrative
domains). The techniques leverage an agent-centric framework for a fully distributed peerto-peer network that allows nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g.,
Holochain). With this framework, the techniques are able to quickly and conveniently
indicate network policies across a chain of service providers, in a distributed manner, and
guarantee that requirements of the policies are met along the chain of service providers.
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